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NOTES
The burden imposed by hypertechnical procedure and the in-
justices which often result call for a re-examination of this phase
of our procedure and the formulation of more workable rules.
Jesse D. McDonald
LOUISIANA PRACTICE- WAIVER OF RIGHT TO CLAIM
ABANDONMENT
After a ten-year delay in the prosecution of the suit, defend-
ant filed a motion requesting the court to order plaintiff to post
bond as security for court costs. Three days later defendant filed
another motion asking that the suit be dismissed for reason that
plaintiff had permitted more than five years to elapse without
having taken any steps in the prosecution. On appeal by plain-
tiff from judgment of dismissal to the Orleans Court of Appeal,
held, reversed. The defendant, by filing a motion requesting the
court to order plaintiff to post bond for court costs, expressed a
willingness to proceed with the trial, and thus waived its right
to invoke a plea of abandonment based on five years non-prosecu-
tion. State ex rel. Fred Shields v. Southport Petroleum Corp., 78
So.2d 201 (La. App: 1955).1
The filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction oper-
ates to interrupt prescription of a cause of action. 2 Article 3519
of the Civil Code provides that this interruption will be consid-
ered as never having occurred if plaintiff allows five years to
elapse without having taken any "steps in the prosecution" of
the suit.8 A step in the prosecution is "some formal move before
1. A companion case now pending before the Supreme Court is State &V rel.
Shields, Inc. v. Southport Petroleum Corp., 78 So.2d 201 (La. App. 1955). The
court of appeal transferred this case to the Supreme Court for lack of juris-
diction.
2. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950) : "The filing of a suit in a court of competent juris-
diction shall interrupt all prescriptions affecting the cause of action therein sued
upon, against all defendants, including minors and interdicts." See LA. CIV.IL CODE
art. 3518 (1870).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3519 (1870), a8 amenaded, La. Acts 1954, No. 615, p.
1119: "If the plaintiff in this case, after having made his demand, abandons or
discontinues it, the interruption shall be considered as having never happened.
"Whenever the plaintiff having made his demand shall at any time before ob-
taining final judgment allow five years to elapse without having taken any steps
in the prosecution thereof, he shall be considered as having abandoned the same.
"Any appeal, now or hereafter pending in any appellate court of the State, in
which five years have elapsed without any steps having been taken in the prosecu-
tion thereof, shall be considered as abandoned, and the court in which said appeal




the court, intended to hasten judgment. ' 4 It is "something more
than a mere passive effort to keep the suit on the docket of the
court." The presumption of abandonment created by article
3519 is not conclusive, as plaintiff may show that his inaction
was caused by circumstances beyond his control." In early de-
cisions the courts held that article 3519 is not self operative, and
that defendant must move for dismissal of the suit after the lapse
of five years.7 Under these decisions the right to demand a dis-
missal is waived by defendant if his actions have been incon-
sistent with an intent to treat the case as abandoned." However,
in recent cases interpreting article 3519 the court has held that
abandonment results as a legal consequence of plaintiff's inaction
in failing to prosecute the suit for a period of five years.9 The
leading case supporting this view is Evans v. Hamner,10 where
the Supreme Court held that plaintiff's cause of action was ipso
facto abandoned, without the necessity of a motion by defendant
to have the abandonment judicially declared. This ruling ap-
pears to have been accepted by the legislature in a recent amend-
ment to article 3519.11
In the instant case the Orleans Court of Appeal has reas-
serted the position taken in the early decisions that there could
be a waiver of the right to claim abandoninent if defendant's
actions indicated an intent not to treat the case as abandoned.
By doing so, however, the court appears to have overlooked the
4. State v. Edrington, 11 Orl. App. 288 (La. App. 1914) ; see Note, 16 Louisi-
ANA LAW REVIEW 182 (1955), for a discussion of this problem in criminal cases.
5. Augusta Sugar v. Haley, 163 La. 814, 112 So. 731 (1927).
6. Barton v. Burbank, 138 La. 997, 71 So. 134 (1916) ; Bell v. Staring, 170
So. 502 (La. App. 1936); Cotonio v. Richardson, 4 Orl. App. 280 (La. App.
1907).
7. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. J. M. Dresser Co., 14 La. App. 555, 131 So.
752 (1930), cited with approval in King v. Illinois Central R.R., 143 So. 95, 97
(La. App. 1932).
8. Continental Supply Co. v. Fisher Oil Co., 156 La. 101, 100 So. 64 (1924);
Geisenberger v. Cotton, 116 La. 651, 40 So. 929 (1906) ; King v. Illinois Central
R.R., 143 So. 95 (La. App. 1932). In the King case, defendant was held to have
waived its right to have the suit dismissed for abandonment by moving to revoke
an order permitting the filing of a supplemental petition.
9. State v. United Dredging Co., 218 La. 744, 50 So.2d 826 (1951) ; Sandfield
Oil and Gas Co. v. Paul, 7 So.2d 725, 732 (1942) ; Evans v. Hamner, 209 La. 442,
24 So.2d 814 (1946), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1945-1946 Term - Procedure, 7 LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 270 (1947) ; Senseley
v. First National Life Insurance Co., 205 La. 61, 16 So.2d 906 (1944).
10. 209 La. 442, 24 So.2d 814 (1946).
11. La. Acts 1954, No. 615, p. 1119: "Any appeal, now or hereafter pending
in any appellate court of the State, in which five years have elapsed without any
steps having been taken in the prosecution thereof, shall be considered as aban-




automatic abandonment rule laid down by the Supreme Court in
the Evans case. 1 2 Under the Evans case, defendant is not re-
quired to take any action as the case is automatically dismissed.
Thus, any action taken by defendant after the expiration of five
years cannot be considered a waiver since the case stands as if it
had already been dismissed. By holding that there can be a
waiver of the right to plead abandonment in the instant case,
however, the Orleans Court of Appeal in effect has held that de-
fendant must file a motion to dismiss the suit. The implication
of this decision is that the intermediate appellate court has re-
turned to the old rule that abandonment is not self operative and
must be pleaded. If defendant takes any action inconsistent with
an intent to treat the case as abandoned, he will be considered
to have waived the right to claim abandonment. 18 It is difficult
to reconcile this holding with the rule of automatic abandonment
of the Evans case. In addition, the decision in the instant case
appears to be inconsistent with the new language of article
3519.14
The Louisiana State Law Institute has recommended a pro-
vision much broader than article 3519 of the Civil Code to cover
the subject of abandonment. Under the proposed Code of Prac-
tice,'8 an action is not abandoned unless five years have elapsed
without any steps being taken by any of the parties in the prose-
cution or defense. Moreover, the rule of abandonment in the pro-
posed article is intended to be self operative, patterned after the
Evans case, and to apply to both principal actions and reconven-
tional demands. This new article goes even further than the
jurisprudence in keeping the suit on the docket, as action by
either plaintiff or defendant is sufficient to preclude abandon-
ment. A much simpler rule is that of the United States District
12. The Evans case was not mentioned in the instant decision, but was relied
on by defendant in his brief.
13. In Geisenberger v. Cotton, 116 La. 651, 40 So. 929 (1906), the Supreme
Court qualified the rule as to waiver by holding that any plea to the merits of
the case, coupled with the plea for dismissal would constitute a waiver. From the
instant case, it is quite clear that the only requisite for waiver is conduct on
the part of defendant that indicates a willingness to continue with the trial. Any
plea by defendant in addition to the motion for dismissal seems to meet this test.
The rule is apparently no longer limited to a plea on the merits of the case.
14. See note 11 supra.
15. Article 18: "An action is abandoned when the parties thereto, prior to
judgment, fail to take any bona fide step in the prosecution or defense thereof for
a period of five years. This provision shall be operative without formal order, but
on ex parte motion of any party or other interested person the court shall enter a
formal order of dismissal as of the date of its abandonment." LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION, EXPOSE DES MOTIFS No. 5, at 64
(1953).
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Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Under that court's
rule8 the clerk calls all actions pending and undisposed of in
which no steps in the prosecution have been taken within six
months. To maintain his position on the docket, plaintiff must
appear and show that the failure to take steps was not due to his
fault or lack of reasonable diligence. This federal rule adequate-
ly solves the problem of a docket crowded with cases which the
parties are not interested in prosecuting. By the application of
a presumption of abandonment to every case which has not been
prosecuted actively during each six-month period, the court ef-
fectively expedites the administration of justice and keeps its
docket clear of driftwood. An added advantage in this rule is
the elimination of the technicality of waiver. The parties to the
suit have no discretion in matters relating to dismissal, as the
clerk assumes all responsibility for keeping the docket clear. The
proposal of the Law Institute fails to attain either of these highly
desirable results.
Jerry G. Jones
16. Rule 12: "General Call of Docket. On the third Monday of May and No-
vember of each year, or on such other days at least once each 6 faonths as the
court may by order designate, the clerk under the supervision of the judge and in
open court, shall call all actions pending and undisposed of in which no steps or
proceedings appear to have been taken within 6 months.
"Notice of all general calls of the docket shall be given by mailing copies of
such notice to all attorneys of record in each case to be called. If none of the parties
or their attorneys appear at the time and place stated for the general call and
make answer when an action is called, the court may direct the clerk to enter an
order dismissing the action for want of prosecution. (As Am'd. April 7, 1953)
"If at the call it is shown that the failure to take steps or proceedings is not
due to the plaintiff's fault or lack of reasonable diligence on his part the action
will hold its place on the docket.
"The court may make such other orders as may facilitate the prompt and just
disposition of any action." GENERAL, CIVIL AND ADMIRALTY RULES, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, Rule 12 (1944), 8
FED. RULES SEBr. 978 (1945).
